Introduction
Not all testimony given by witnesses participating in international criminal trials is welcome to all. The trials are often contentious in the countries where the alleged crimes took place, and vested interests at all levels of society can make participation in these trials dangerous. International criminal law requires the testimony of witnesses, and so it must seek to protect them against the risks associated with their role. Where the risk to a witness is particularly severe, it will not be possible for that person to return home after testifying. In that case, they must be relocated to a safe third country.
Many of the witnesses who testify before the International Criminal Court (ICC) can be adequately protected through the Court's witness protection programme.
However, the programme is characterized by an opaqueness that has left some witnesses unwilling to rely on it for their protection. These witnesses suggest that the programme's lack of transparency conceals a number of shortfalls that limit its effectiveness. As these witnesses find themselves on the ICC host state's territory, they have turned to The Netherlands as an alternative source of protection. They argue that they cannot be removed from the territory of The Netherlands because this would violate the international law obligation of non-refoulement. The prohibition on refoulement is, at its most basic, the right not to be returned to a country where one would be exposed to certain risks.
In recent years, a number of witnesses have lodged asylum applications with
The Netherlands. While not always successful, the resulting case law before the Dutch Courts has shed light on the interesting interaction between the ICC protection regime and the Dutch protection regime. However, the possibility of a nonrefoulement claim against The Netherlands is not a problem-free alternative to protection by the ICC; the co-existence of two protection regimes can lead to buckpassing among the actors involved. For this reason it is important for the ICC to ensure, as far as possible, that its witness protection programme remedies the shortfalls that give witnesses cause for concern. To an extent this can be done by incorporating substantive and procedural elements of the international law prohibition on refoulement into the programme's operation. Article 21(3) ICC Statute provides a tool for doing so, as it requires that the Statute be interpreted and applied in line with human rights norms. However, there are limitations to what can be achieved with Article 21(3), and not all problems can be remedied in this way.
In order to explore the issues described above, this article will begin with a preliminary overview of the nature of the obligations incumbent on the ICC and The
Netherlands, as regards non-refoulement. This will be followed in Section 3 by a description of how witness relocation at the ICC operates and the shortcomings of the witness protection programme. It will be suggested that some of the shortfalls can be addressed by incorporating in the ICC's witness relocation programme the requirements of the prohibition on refoulement. In Section 4, the paper will go on to discuss the case law that has arisen from ICC witnesses seeking protection from refoulement before Dutch Courts, and how these Courts have worked out the interaction between the two regimes. Section 4 will conclude with a description of the problems that arise when multiple protection regimes operate simultaneously. In practice, the Court has taken a restrictive view of the impact of the prohibition on refoulement on the ICC's obligations. While it considers that 'the Court cannot disregard the customary rule of non-refoulement', it maintains that it is 'unable to implement the principle within its ordinary meaning …only a state which possesses territory is actually able to comply with the non-refoulement principle.' 4 To an extent this analysis is correct: in order for a person not to be expelled, there must be a territory from which they are to be expelled. The ICC has no territory on which to offer the protection that the prohibition from refoulement entails. However, it will be argued below that the obligation of non-refoulement can influence other aspects of 4 Decision on an Amicus Curiae application and on the "Requête tendant à obtenir présentations des témoins DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 aux autorités néerlandaises aux fins d'asile" (articles 68 and 93(7) of the Statute), Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2011 (Katanga, 9 June 2011).
Preliminary Observations on the Nature and Scope of Obligations
witness protection, and just because the ICC cannot implement it in a traditional manner, does not mean that it should not inform the interpretation and application of the law.
The Netherlands, for its part, is bound by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. For individuals to invoke this obligation, they must be subject to a particular kind of risk, as not all types of risk give rise to the prohibition on refoulement. The risks in Article 33 are confined to: a threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or political opinion. There are more provisions on non-refoulement in other international conventions, such as Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the latter being particularly relevant where
The Netherlands is concerned. However, due to space limitations, the focus of this article will be limited to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.
The obligation of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention is closely linked to the legal status of asylum. Where non-refoulement is successfully invoked, this will often mean that an application for asylum would also be successful. They are both necessary for an individual fleeing risk: non-refoulement is the right not to be sent back, while asylum is the right to stay. Article 1 Refugee Convention sets out when a person qualifies for asylum. The wording is different from Article 33; instead of requiring a threat to freedom or life, there must be a well-founded fear of persecution (the grounds of race, religion, etc., remain same). However, there is general consensus that these provisions are intended to cover the same risks and have the same meaning.
5 Therefore, when this article discusses examples from practice of asylum applications made by witnesses, this is taken to apply equally to nonrefoulement situations.
Witness Relocation at the ICC

A. The Statutory Basis for the ICC Protection Programme
An effective witness protection programme is vital for the operation of any international criminal tribunal. Many of the situations currently before the ICC involve conflicts where the system of government and formal authority has broken down. As documentary evidence for use at trial is not always widely available, individuals who have seen the events first hand are essential to the criminal justice process. The circumstances in the witnesses' home countries also make a well functioning protection scheme at the Court all the more important, as there may not be the national resources available to offer protection at the domestic level.
To date, most witnesses before the ICC have required some degree of judicial protective measures. These measures can only be ordered by the Chambers of the Court, and include the use of pseudonyms, excluding the public from observing the testifying witness (closed session), and image and voice distortion. 6 At times however, these measures are not considered sufficient to keep a witness safe from reprisals. Before they come to the Court, the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the ICC must ensure some witnesses can be relocated to a safe third state after giving their testimony. Relocation is a non-judicial protective measure created to cope with the most serious challenges of witness protection. 7 Witnesses can be relocated within their own country, or they can be relocated abroad. It is the latter situation that is most relevant to this article. The Appeals Chamber has been keen to stress that as it is highly disruptive to the lives of the witnesses and their families, relocation is a measure of last resort and should not be used lightly. 8 Article 68 is the principal witness protection provision in the ICC Statue, and covers all protective measures including relocation. The Article imposes an overarching duty on the Court as a whole to 'take all appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses'. The article was broadened from its originally proposed formulation, which required only 'necessary measures' to be taken. 9 The formulation of Article 68 is 
B. The Shortfalls of the ICCPP
Witnesses who are included in the ICCPP must deal with a protection regime that is opaque and lacks transparency. As such, it is not always clear what type of treatment they will receive. This has left some witnesses dissatisfied with the protection offered by the ICC, and these have looked elsewhere for protection, in particular to The Netherlands. One might wonder what would lead a witness to this choice, when the ICC is able to protect them from returning to a situation of risk through relocation.
The witnesses who have applied for asylum in The Netherlands have put forward a number of arguments as to why they prefer the asylum route to ICC relocation. First, the witnesses pointed out that it was not clear whether they would have the same procedural and substantive rights as they would otherwise have under international law. Second, they pointed to the fact that the scope of protection under the ICCPP is narrower than under refugee law. And thirdly, the witnesses had concerns about the ICCPP's dependence on state cooperation.
Beginning with the first point, the witnesses argued that international law requires a certain quality of protection for persons who would be at risk if returned to their home country, and that this can only be provided by a state. Since the ICC has no territory, it cannot guarantee the rights that the Refugee Convention would ensure for the witnesses. They went on to suggest that, even if the ICC could provide these rights, it is not bound by the Refugee Convention and so has no obligation to do so. 19 There are two strands to this argument. On the one hand, there may be procedural rights that the Refugee Convention grants which are not covered by the ICCPP. On the other, there are substantive rights that attach to persons covered by the Convention that may not be granted to witnesses in the ICCPP.
To begin with procedural matters, it is not clear what safeguards and
assistance is given to witnesses in the ICCPP. For example, it is not known whether witnesses in the ICCPP have access to legal assistance when seeking relocation.
Under the Refugee Convention, there is an obligation on states to provide free legal representation from the beginning of an asylum procedure. 20 This is necessary because the individual in question will not be familiar with the legal system of the receiving state or with the grounds for the recognition of refugees. It will be harder for individuals to make their case if they do not know what type of information they should be providing. This is surely of equal importance when witnesses are making their case for participation in the ICCPP and for relocation. The ICC system will more than likely be unfamiliar to them, as will the grounds for protection through relocation. Other procedural issues include access to a court to deal with issues that may arise with the relocation and a lack of access to review of decisions made about a person's protective measures in the context of the ICCPP.
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Turning to substantive rights, under the Refugee Convention refugees are given certain rights. Refugees who lawfully stay on a state's territory can work, receive an education and benefit from a number of welfare provisions. 22 The position of witnesses relocated through the ICCPP is much less clear. The confidentiality of the programme is such that it is not known whether there is a set of minimum rights that witnesses will benefit from, and or whether these are the same in all receiving states. Furthermore, the witnesses specifically raised the issue of the long-term reliability of their relocation. 23 Will they retain their protected status once the trial is concluded? What about ten years from now? It is possible that the risk will reduce over time, but it also may not. There will be a difference in the dynamic between the individual seeking protection and the receiving state depending on whether the witness is protected under the Refugee Convention or through the ICCPP. In the former case, the relationship exists principally between the individual and the receiving state, with the individual's country of origin playing but a small role. In the latter, the relationship between the individual and the receiving state is less important than that between the ICC and the receiving state. The latter relationship might affect the attitude of the state towards the witness. This is a matter of concern, especially given the changeability of public opinion towards the ICC. If the programme were actively applied in a manner consistent with the international customary law right of non-refoulement, many of the issues regarding procedural and substantive rights could be addressed. The availability of legal assistance to witnesses and other procedural rights would be relatively easy to apply (except perhaps on the budgetary level). As to the substantive rights, provision for these could be made in the relocation agreements. Some may argue that the procedural safeguards and detailed substantive rights discussed in the preceding paragraphs are not part of the customary norm, but rather exist only within the treaty regime. It is argued here that these rights imbue the prohibition on refoulement with fairness and are necessary to make the right effective.
The second objection of the witnesses to the ICCPP related to its scope. Even if a state agrees to sign a relocation agreement with the Court, there is nothing in that agreement to compel a state to accept witnesses on its territory in any given instance. 42 The Assembly of States Parties has used this factor to encourage states to enter into relocation agreements, highlighting that the agreements are 'extremely flexible as witnesses are accepted on a case-by-case basis'. 43 What this means however, is that even with relocation agreements in place, the ICCPP is still at the mercy of state cooperation.
The witnesses were justified in raising concerns about the functioning of the ICCPP, and these concerns should be carefully examined by the ICC. Some of them would be relatively easy to resolve through the mechanism in Article 21(3). Others would not be so easily dealt with; the matter of state cooperation is likely to plague the Court for some time. It is not surprising therefore that some witnesses have turned to the arguably more secure and transparent route of claiming protection from refoulement from The Netherlands. That being said, before this route could be considered a viable alternative to ICC protection, the interaction between the ICC regime and the Dutch protection regime had to be worked out.
The Interaction Between the ICCPP and the Non-Refoulement Obligations of The Netherlands
The witnesses who raised concerns about the ICCPP turned to the ICC's host state as an alternative source of protection. However, there is an important preliminary remark to be made. The types of risks that could found a non-refoulement claim in The Netherlands are not unlimited; there must be a risk to life or freedom on grounds of race, religion, nationality or membership of a social group or political opinion. 44 It is possible then that not all witnesses who would qualify for participation in the ICCPP could also be protected by The Netherlands. Where there is overlap between the regimes, with witnesses who qualify under both regimes, only then need the interaction between them be established. The discussion can be illustrated with some examples from practice. Since 2011, a number of asylum claims have been lodged with The Netherlands by witnesses appearing before the ICC. As mentioned above, asylum claims are not strictly the same as seeking protection from refoulement, but the approach to deciding their merits is in the relevant ways the same.
At this stage, a distinction must be drawn between normal witnesses and detained witnesses. 45 Normal witnesses come to the seat of the Court and are free to move around the host state as they wish (subject to possible restrictions placed on them by the host state). Detained witnesses on the other hand, are those who are imprisoned in their own country for domestic crimes. They are transferred to the ICC pursuant to Article 93(7) ICC Statute, which stipulates that they must remain detained while at the Court and be returned to the sending state on completion of their testimony. An agreement to this effect is also concluded between the sending state and the Court, with the legal basis and authority for detaining the witnesses remaining with the sending state. The ICC detention unit essentially carries out the detention imposed by a state.
For these two categories of witnesses, the interaction between the ICC protection regime and The Netherlands' non-refoulement obligations is different. The practice for each will be discussed in separate sections, followed by an overview of the dangers that the interaction between the regimes can engender. Rather than ensure better protection for witnesses, the existence of more than one regime of protection might actually reduce their security.
A. Non-detained Witnesses
For witnesses at liberty, the division of labour for protection from return to a situation of risk would seem to apply in a straightforward way. The primary responsibility for witnesses' protection rests with the ICC because the state parties, when drafting and ratifying the ICC Statute, agreed to make it so. The Statute and RPE are unambiguous in placing the Court as a whole under an obligation to protect witnesses from being 
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His reasoning was that, as the ICC was already providing for the relocation of the witnesses, there was no danger of them being returned to their country of origin. As such, there was no well-founded risk of persecution on the grounds listed in the Refugee Convention. 48 The witnesses appealed this decision, leading to a decision of the Council of State of The Netherlands, the highest appeal court for matters of administrative law, including immigration law. This appeal decision, which was in favour of the witnesses, was delivered in February 2014.
In this appeal, the State Secretary continued with the line of argument that the Refugee Convention did not apply, supplemented with assertions that the ICC has always found a safe third country to relocate witnesses to in the past, and that it must be assumed that the ICC is bound by non-refoulement. 49 On the applicability of the Article 1(A). This would contradict the Refugee Convention system, which explicitly states the limitations to refugee status in Article 1(C) to (F).
The conclusion of the Council's line of argument is that the participation of the witnesses in the ICCPP does not preclude the applicability of the Refugee Convention. In essence, the Council held that both systems of protection apply in parallel. The result was that the witnesses were indeed granted asylum, and now live as refugees in The Netherlands.
B. Detained witnesses
The situation of detained witness is more complex. Article 93(7) stipulates that detained persons appearing before the ICC must remain detained while at the premises of the Court, and be returned to the sending state on completion of their testimony. This is reiterated in Rule 192 RPE and in the Standard Operating Procedure. According to the agreement between the ICC and the DRC, the authority to detain the witnesses remains with the DRC. In the normal course of events, the witnesses would simply have been returned to the DRC on conclusion of their testimony. However before they could be returned, they applied for asylum in The Netherlands and began a long legal dispute about their status. The detained witnesses had further arguments for not participating in the ICC witness protection program. The reasoning was explained by Duty Counsel for the witnesses, who pointed to the fact that the ICC witness protection regime was designed for people at liberty, and so various protective measures are simply not available for detained persons, the most obvious being relocation. 52 While the ICC can seek assurances from the sending state as to the treatment of the witness on return, assurances can leave much to be desired in human rights protection. This is evidenced by the strict requirements that the European Court of Human Rights places on assurances when an individual is removed to a non-member state. 53 Furthermore, Duty Counsel argued that the ICC did not have the power to ensure proper protection in the DRC through assurances, as it is from the DRC authorities themselves that the witnesses required protection. 54 The following discussion will outline the position of the ICC on this issue, followed by the position of the host state, and concluding with the current state of affairs.
Trial Chambers I and II, while adopting separate decisions on the matter, both refused to issue an order for the witnesses' return once the asylum applications had been made. 55 The decision was made on the basis of Article 21(3), as to return the witnesses immediately would interfere with their right to seek asylum, as well as with the ability of The Netherlands to comply with its obligation to consider the asylum claim. 56 According to Trial Chamber I, it is the responsibility of the Court to ensure that the witnesses have a "real -as opposed to a merely theoretical -opportunity" to make an asylum request before being returned to the DRC. 57 As such, the ICC had to ensure a delay until the Dutch authorities had time to consider the application, as well as allow access to lawyers. This further demonstrates the importance of Article 21(3):
in this case it allowed the Chambers to refuse to apply a provision of the Statute on human rights grounds.
According to the Trial Chambers, this was as far as the ICC's obligation extended in the matter of the asylum application and non-refoulement of the witnesses. Even though the Court cannot disregard the rule of non-refoulement, it was the opinion of Trial Chamber II that only a state that possesses territory can apply it.
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Nor can the Court use the cooperation mechanisms in the Statute to compel a state to accept a witness onto their territory. 59 As the matter proceeded, the Trial Chambers considered that their own obligations under Article 68 ICC Statute were discharged.
They had secured from the DRC sufficient guarantees for the protection of the witnesses to remove any impediment to their return, save for the Dutch asylum proceedings. 60 The initial position of The Netherlands in 2011 was that the asylum claims could proceed as any other under national law. 61 However a few months later the authorities changed their mind, stating that the Dutch asylum procedure did not apply, and that the claims would be dealt with as 'requests for protection'. 62 It was unclear whether this sui generis request for protection would have the same safeguards as the domestic procedures, such as access to judicial review. It was also unclear whether this process would have resulted in refugee status, or whether they would have some lesser status. 63 This particular issue was resolved on 28 December 2011, when the Amsterdam District Court (sitting in The Hague) issued a decision stating that Dutch asylum law and procedure did indeed apply to the witnesses. Netherlands has no jurisdiction over them. 67 The District Court disagreed with these arguments. It distinguished this situation from that of asylum applications submitted to Dutch embassies abroad. In those cases, there is an alternative forum for an asylum claim, namely the state where the embassy is located. 68 This is one of the more interesting aspects of this decision.
The approach to jurisdiction seems to be that it exists because it must, because otherwise there would be a legal vacuum. If the witnesses cannot turn to The
Netherlands for asylum, they cannot turn to anyone. 69 As the decision was not appealed, the reasoning went unchallenged.
There are further arguments in favour of the existence of Dutch jurisdiction.
First, non-refoulement applies to rejection at the frontier. 70 Even if the witnesses are in ICC custody, they are still on Dutch territory. As such, they can be said to be at the legal frontier of the state and can request entrance. The same non-refoulement obligations would therefore apply and the host state could not remove the individual from its territory. Second, an analogy can be drawn between international criminal tribunals and so called 'international zones', such as airports and areas of territory declared to be outside the realm of the law. states have sought to remove these areas from the jurisdiction of refugee law, but the applicability of non-refoulement remains unchanged.
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The current state of affairs for the detained witnesses in this case is as follows.
Even though the jurisdiction hurdle was passed, the obstacle of the witnesses' personal history was not. The Netherlands opted to exclude them from refugee protection under Article 1(F) of the Refugee Convention, on the basis that there were serious reasons to believe that they had committed war crimes. Efforts to prevent their return to the DRC based on Articles 3 and 6 of the ECHR eventually failed on appeal. 72 These articles deal respectively with torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, and fair trial. Article 3 in particular operates to prevent an ECHR member state from sending an individual to a country where they would be exposed to a risk of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. 73 As such the article is an important source of protection complementary to the Refugee Convention. The witnesses have now returned to the DRC.
C. The Dangers of Overlapping Protection Regimes
What the case law shows is that for both detained and non-detained witnesses, the protection regimes at the ICC and in The Netherlands operate in parallel, both applying to the same individuals simultaneously. The fact that one actor is obliged to protect the witnesses does not remove the obligation from the other. This gives rise to a shared responsibility situation, as both parties are concurrently responsible for protecting witnesses from refoulement. This is a positive, but also potentially dangerous, development.
It is positive in the sense that it provides a broader protection for witnesses coming to the ICC. Their protection from return to a situation of risk covers a broader range of risks than the ICC alone can provide. In addition to risks incurred because of their association with the Court, witnesses are also covered for the risks enumerated in Article 33 Refugee Convention (if these happen to not overlap). Furthermore, the shortcomings in the ICCPP could be to some extent addressed by using an asylum procedure instead. The choice of protection rests with the witnesses themselves, as both regimes are based on consent.
But there are a number of issues that remain problematic. Firstly, the host state could rely on the ICC's assessment of the witnesses' protection needs in order to make its own determination. The host state authorities, rather than conducting its own inquiry, might simply take note of the decision reached by the ICC on the risks to the witness, and act solely on that basis. In so doing, The Netherlands would be delegating its responsibilities under the Refugee Convention entirely to an international organization, which is not appropriate. The Dutch authorities may not have access to the same information on which the ICC based its decision, or indeed may have additional information not available to the Court. The same is also true in reverse: the ICC could unduly rely on the outcome of a Dutch asylum procedure to make its own decision on witness protection. The ICC and The Netherlands would have to take great care to remember that the scope of protection under refugee law and under the witness protection regime at the ICC are different. While they may in some instances overlap, the risks protected against are different, and if when relying on the assessment of the other this is overlooked, a witness could be wrongfully deprived of protection.
The second problem is that it is not clear at what point one regime takes priority over the other. They may both operate in parallel, but an individual cannot be both relocated through the ICCPP, and at the same time be a refugee in The
Netherlands. This would require the witness to have dual status, which would involve both parties using their resources to doubly protect an individual: something highly unlikely. That being said, both parties are still obliged to discharge their obligations, and it is not clear whether they can refer to the actions of the other when doing so.
According to Duty Counsel for the detained witnesses, presenting the witnesses to the host state authorities for an asylum determination qualifies as a protective measure under Rule 88 ICC RPE. 74 But in that case the ICC elected to discharge its obligations independently from the asylum proceedings, namely by seeking assurances from the DRC as to the detained witnesses' safety. Can one regime be said to prevail over the other, and if so on what basis? Does one regime provide intrinsically better protection, such that the other regime becomes secondary?
Recent practice has shed some light on these issues. In its June 2014 decision 75 (which resulted in the return of the detained witnesses to the DRC), the Dutch Council of State discussed the relationship between the protective measures ordered by the ICC, and the obligations of The Netherlands towards the witnesses. On the matter of assessing the protection needs of witnesses, the Council stressed that this was a question for The Netherlands, and was not to be left to the ICC. There had been no transfer of jurisdiction on this point to the ICC. 76 The Council of State did feel able, however, to rely on the protective measures put in place by the ICC in order to satisfy
The Netherlands' obligations under the ECHR (the Refugee Convention was no longer relevant, as the witnesses had been excluded under Article 1F). In response to claims by the witnesses that their Article 3 and 6 ECHR rights would be violated if returned to the DRC, the Council held that the assurances given by the DRC, as well as the continuing involvement of the VWU, meant that no significant risk existed. 77 The Court evaluated the assurances against the criteria set out by the European Court of Human Rights in Othman 78 and found them satisfactory. Furthermore, it held that the protective measures would, in practice, guard against risks not related to the witnesses' involvement with the ICC. 79 A final danger is that of 'buck passing'. 80 This is often a feature in situations of shared responsibility: the presence of numerous, potentially responsible, entities can decrease the sense of accountability in all. In this context, it describes the possibility that each actor, namely the ICC and The Netherlands, might reduce the scope of its protection in the expectation that the other will fill the resultant gap. 81 One might speculate as to whether buck-passing has occurred in the case of the detained witnesses set out above. In the day-to-day practice of the ICC, it seems unlikely that a differentiation as strict as that applied by Trial Chamber II, between the different risks suffered by witnesses, 82 would be used. It is more probable that relocation is simply granted when the individual is deemed to be at risk, as long as the risk is not too far removed from the witness' involvement with the Court. However when the detained witnesses situation arose, the Chamber knew that the asylum proceedings would go ahead regardless. Arguably, the distinction between types of risk was therefore emphasised in order for primary responsibility of the witnesses to pass to The Netherlands, which also tried to avoid responsibility.
Conclusion
It has been suggested that asylum proceedings of the kind discussed in this paper are being used as a shortcut to relocation in a European country, 83 specifically The Netherlands. But this assumption overlooks the genuine concerns that witnesses can have about the quality of protection provided by the ICC through witness relocation.
The ICC has the opportunity, through Article 21(3), to deal with these concerns and make the ICCPP more attractive to witnesses seeking protection. However, there are other difficulties for which Article 21(3) offers no solution. The dependence on reluctant states for cooperation in relocation is particularly problematic; and the narrow scope of risk covered by the ICCPP, while justified, may result in witnesses being returned to situations of risk.
As a solution to these issues, claiming protection from refoulement against the host state of the ICC is a possibility. Now that the particulars of the interaction between the ICC and Dutch protection systems has been to a large extent worked out, it will be easier for witnesses in the future. But this is not a full solution. What is meant to enhance witness protection may actually diminish it if the dangers of overlapping protection regimes are not carefully considered. The differences in the scope of the regimes, and the different approaches permitted to each actor, are factors that must be borne in mind if witnesses are not to fall through the protection net. It will be important for all involved to bear in mind, as these cases proceed and as more inevitably arise, that the paramount concern should be the protection of the witness, and not shifting responsibility between the actors and failing to act in the expectation that the other will. It would be a blemish on the face of international justice if a witness were to be killed or harmed following their involvement with the process,and would work against the aims that international justice is seeking to achieve.
